

The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform

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The danger of communism comes from the misery of the masses, and where governments show no disposition to alleviate the economic condition, or even to hold forth hope of a higher standard of living. I venture that not one "communist" in ten knows what communism is. He understands it is something extremely opposite to the system under which he suffers and he joins the communists as a protest striking blindly and stupidly. He is convinced that nothing could be worse than his present state. Here again, as all through history, we encounter the stupidity of the over-privileged in refusing to concede anything to the man below.

—Claude Bowers to Joseph Grew, 14 June 1945.

I want you to know that what you say fits in precisely with my own thinking.

—Joseph Grew to Claude Bowers, 29 June 1945.

Before retiring in August 1945, Joseph Grew had risen through the ranks in the State Department to become the acting secretary of state. Yet he was and remains most readily identified by the ten years he spent as the American ambassador to Tokyo. It was on the basis of his tenure there, and with the help of friends and colleagues drawn primarily from that embassy, that he exercised a considerable influence on American planning for the Occupation of Japan. Keenly aware of the failure of the last European peace settlement, these Japan hands were often criticized as the advocates of a "soft" peace. As if to invite such criticism, Grew publicly urged the abandonment of any vindictiveness in planning for the peace. It was the same kind of blind prejudice which in the last war had been directed against the Germans, he told a Chicago audience in December 1943, that prevented so many Americans from admitting "that there can be anything good in Japan or any good elements in the Japanese race." Without a postwar policy that would seek to strengthen these good elements and win their cooperation, he implied, the Japanese might simply follow the German example and wait a generation before trying again. There would be

little lasting benefit to the United States, Grew warned President Harry S. Truman in June 1945, "if we were to achieve merely a military victory and fail to pursue the victory into the field of ideas."¹

Ironically, the influence that Grew and his circle exercised is often presented in the literature on the Occupation as though it were malevolent and their primary purpose the retention of as much of pre-war Japan as possible. If the Japan hands had had their way, one recent author has insisted, the Occupation would not have instituted "the far-reaching changes that remade Japan's economic structure into a mass consumer economy: the land reform, labor unions, democratization of business, and so forth." A careful study of the origins of the Occupation's land reform policy suggests that much of this criticism of the Japan hands is unwarranted, the product of contemporary prejudices and faulty recollections. While macroeconomic and trade policies were never clearly developed during the period of presurrender planning, and while there was a range of opinion as to the best means to promote structural economic reform, a broad consensus on the need for basic social reform in Japan did emerge. The Japan hands shared and played a central role in the formation of this consensus. Unlike those who hoped to see radical change brought about by revolution, they placed their hopes in reformist Japanese and a progressive American Occupation. Some of them were uncertain as to the feasibility of such measures as thoroughgoing land reform, and wished to see what the situation on the ground in Japan would look like before deciding, but all of them appear to have recognized the desirability of economic reform as a means of contributing to the emergence of a more liberal and democratic Japanese society. They were convinced, as Grew wrote to General Douglas MacArthur on 22 August 1945, "that a great many fundamental changes must be wrought in the whole Japanese system before that misguided country can take its proper place among the peace-loving nations."²

The portrait of the Japan hands as opponents of needed reforms was drawn forcefully by their contemporary critics. Grew's alleged concern with the practical and ethical difficulties of fostering democracy in postwar Japan, T. A. Bisson wrote in one issue of *The Nation*,

1. Joseph Grew, "War and Post-War Problems in the Far East," Department of State *Bulletin*, 1 Jan. 1944, 11. Grew memorandum for the president, 13 June 1945, Confidential File, White House Central Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am indebted to Akira Iriye, Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, and Fredrik Logevall for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.

2. Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* ed. Herbert Passin (New York, 1987), 17. Grew to MacArthur, 22 Aug. 1945, MSAm1687 v. 122(29), Joseph C. Grew Papers (hereafter Grew Papers), Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

was thoroughly hypocritical. "What Grew, Dooman, and their followers are really concerned about is something quite different. They fear a popular revolt which will topple the 'moderates'—Emperor, *Zaibatsu*, landlords, and the rest—which, they hope, will retain power in post-war Japan." It is surprising to note the extent to which this characterization has been maintained over the years. Grew, one is informed by Howard Schonberger, "thought extensive changes in the Japanese political economy were not required to achieve a stable and peaceful nation." Grew and his former counsellor of embassy, Eugene Dooman, according to Theodore Cohen, "staunchly defended Japanese big business as the element most likely to serve as a bulwark against military resurgence." Grew was "brought up among the very wealthy," John Roberts claims, and "gravitated toward his own kind in Japan and was on cordial terms with leading members of the *zaibatsu* families." Similarly, Marlene Mayo maintains that Grew had "only a superficial understanding of Japan's past. His ten years there had been spent largely with the rich and powerful." Susan Deborah Chira asserts that Grew and Dooman's opposition "effectively stopped" a proposal for land reform from being adopted in Washington. Even Edwin Reischauer once held that the "essentially quite conservative" Grew turned down a proposal to transfer land ownership from the hands of nonfarming landowners to their tenants.³

Fortunately, Mayo, Cohen, and Schonberger contend, a commitment to economic reform was "somehow"—and each of them use that particular word—smuggled past hostile Japan hands into the central Occupation policy documents: SWNCC 150 and JCS 1380. The credit for this operation is given largely to an economist named Edwin Martin. Martin, who was then working on far eastern economic affairs out of the office of Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, certainly played an important role in the drafting of what became the economics section of SWNCC 150. But instead of evidence of Japan hand opposition to his efforts, or to economic reform in general, what

3. T. A. Bisson, "What Program for Japan?" *Nation*, 14 July 1945, 28. Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, Ohio, 1989), 29. Cohen, 167. John G. Roberts, "The 'Japan Crowd' and the *Zaibatsu* Restoration," *Japan Interpreter* 12 (Summer 1979): 387. Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952* (Carbondale, Ill., 1984), 29–30. Susan Deborah Chira, *Cautious Revolutionaries: Occupation Planners and Japan's Post-War Land Reform*, (Tokyo, 1982), 76. Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York, 1986), 104. After reading an earlier version of this essay, Reischauer commented that it was "entirely convincing" and that he had inadvertently "perpetuated a common misapprehension of the time that Ambassador Grew was essentially a conservative man." Reischauer to author, 8 Aug. 1990.

one is offered by these authors is the assumption that since the Japan hands were drafting proposals that did not contain a commitment to economic reform in 1944, they could not have been sincere in supporting proposals that did contain such a commitment in 1945. It is simply taken for granted by these authors that relative latecomers to the planning process, such as Martin, would have advocated the same positions a year earlier. Without these assumptions, the evolution of policy appears to have less to do with mysterious maneuverings and more to do with uncertainty about what was practicable, tension over how "punitive" the Occupation should be, and the natural tendency of tentative plans to become more developed and more definite over time.⁴

"Military government shall encourage," the relevant and allegedly covert passage in SWNCC 150 states, "the development of democratic organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, and shall favor a wider distribution of ownership, management and control of the Japanese economic system." There can be no doubt that Grew was fully aware of this provision, the intention of which was probably, as his friend Sir George Sansom suggested at the time, "to cover the breakdown of the monopolies of the great corporations (Zaibatsu) and perhaps also agrarian reforms." Not only is there no hint in the documentary record that Grew was opposed to such reforms, there is also solid evidence that he thought them right and necessary.⁵

"As for the old feudal system," Grew wrote to William Wharton on 25 October 1945, "my feeling is that the most important step towards destroying it permanently is to break up the Zaibatsu, the six or seven families who control most of the wealth and the industrial life of the country through enormous cartels, and give the farmers a new deal and a chance to raise their standard of living." Comparable expressions can be found throughout Grew's letters at this time. "The Japanese are not fitted, yet, for complete democracy," he wrote to Charles Reifsnider, warning that an elected president would mean political chaos. "They had better keep the throne as the one stabilizing influence. The old feudalistic system can best be destroyed by breaking up the Zaibatsu and ensuring the farmers a new deal and a higher standard of living." A long excerpt from one of Grew's letters of this period, clearly indicating his support for economic reform in Japan, was later published in his memoirs. But the policy which he supported has been obscured by the position first ascribed to him by his contempo-

4. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 39–40. Cohen, 34–35. Schonberger, 38–39.

5. SWNCC 150, "Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan," 11 June 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1969), 6:554. Balfour to acting secretary of state, 2 Aug. 1945, *ibid.*, 582.

rary critics and maintained with relatively minor modifications by some recent authors.⁶

Within the presurrender planning structure, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE) was a stronghold of what their critics called the "Japan Crowd." The chairman of the group, George Blakeslee, had taught at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy since its establishment and was, in Grew's opinion, "among our soundest experts on Japanese affairs." Among those regularly in attendance at IDACFE meetings after the spring of 1944 were two others whom Grew would include in that category: Dooman, his former counsellor of embassy, and Joseph Ballantine, who had once served briefly as his first secretary. Other Japan hands regularly present included Erle Dickover, another of Grew's first secretaries; Frank Williams, his former commercial attaché; and Robert Fearey, his former private secretary. Hugh Borton, who had written his doctorate on peasant uprisings in Japan and taught at Columbia for a number of years, served as the group's secretary. There was a considerable range of opinion among these figures, but they were united by their conviction that a punitive peace would not be in America's interest and their belief that fundamental reform in Japan was both necessary and would require Japanese support to succeed. As Borton has written, many of the IDACFE's recommendations "developed into the basic postwar policies for Japan." As far as Grew was concerned, the influence of the Japan hands in the IDACFE and at every level of the planning process was such that SWNCC 150 could be referred to as "our plan,"—the plan of "the so-called 'Japan Crowd' and 'soft peace boys.'"⁷

There is a vast gap between Grew's conception of the Japan hands' role and the conception of that role formulated by Mayo, Cohen, and

6. Grew to: Wharton, 25 Oct. 1945, MSAm1687 v. 123(33); Reifsnider, 19 Oct. 1945, MSAm1687 v. 122(52); Grew Papers. Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945*, 2 vols. (Boston, Mass., 1952), 2:1440–41. Grew's biographer also notes that Grew "approved of the breakup of the zaibatsu and agrarian reform." Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Boston, Mass., 1966), 367.

7. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, 2:1422. Heinrichs, 369. Cohen, 18. Hugh Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan* (New York, 1967), 11. Grew to Elsie and Cecil Lyon, 30 Sept. 1945, MSAm1687 v. 122(26), Grew Papers. Department of State, *Biographic Register* (Washington, D.C., 1944). Dickover stands out to some extent in this group for his conviction that the institution of the throne should be abolished. See Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 206–9. Ballantine stands out, at least in the early period of planning, for the extent of his reliance on reformist elements among the Japanese. See Marlene J. Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943–1945," in Thomas W. Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: Education and Social Reform* (Norfolk, Va., 1982), 23–25.

Schonberger. These authors acknowledge to varying degrees the Japan hands' contribution to the Occupation's political reforms, but this acknowledgment is combined with a portrait of their attitude toward economic reform that cannot be sustained. Mayo has done some of the most sophisticated and detailed work on the period of presurrender planning, and she is certainly correct to call attention to the role of others besides the Japan hands in the planning process. She shows persuasively that the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and many others, all played a vital role in the development of antitrust policy for Japan. But her speculations as to why Dooman and Grew did not forcefully oppose the increasingly explicit anti-*zaibatsu* proposals as they emerged are specious. They completely overlook the fact that Grew, at least, clearly supported breaking up the *zaibatsu*. For Dooman's position they rely on his recollections in spite of the fact that they are, as she notes, mistaken as to how and when *zaibatsu* dissolution was agreed upon. For the Japan hands, the basic objective of economic reform was a widely shared prosperity which would make possible a favorable reorientation of Japanese attitudes. To the extent that a "punitive" perspective informed some of the advocates of *zaibatsu* dissolution, as Mayo suggests, it is not surprising that there should have been tension between them. Such tension hardly constitutes evidence of Japan hand opposition to economic reform.⁸

Cohen and Schonberger go farther than Mayo in their attribution of antireformist positions to the "Japan Crowd." American policy-makers ignored or rejected, Schonberger insists, a more radical perspective that "emphasized strengthening trade unions and other popular forces." Nowhere, Cohen claims, did the Japan hands show "a great interest in labor unions, peasant organizations, or the prewar antiwar 'proletarian parties.'" When questioned as to the wisdom of supporting labor unions during the period of military government, however, Dooman replied that "giving rights to labor would tend to accelerate the process of democratization."⁹

On 15 November 1944, Maxwell Hamilton, a China hand and special assistant to the secretary of state, sat in on a meeting of the IDACFE. When Hamilton stated that he saw no reason why military government should be interested in labor organizations, "Mr. Dooman ex-

8. Marlene J. Mayo, "American Economic Planning for Occupied Japan: The Issue of Zaibatsu Dissolution," in Lawrence H. Redford, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform* (Norfolk, Va., 1980), esp. 222-38.

9. Schonberger, 27. Cohen, 19. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 105, 18 July 1944, Makoto Iokibe, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1954*, Microfiche Collection (Bethesda, Md., 1987), 2-B-86.

plained that the Committee realized that the labor movement up to 1936 had been one of the strong physical points for the development of a more liberal social point of view. The Committee believed therefore that the labor group was one of the best potential elements of liberalism." Two days later, in a presentation before the Post-War Programs Committee (PWC), then the highest presurrender planning body in the State Department, Blakeslee emphasized that because of the liberal political potential of workers' organizations, the IDACFE recommended that their formation "be encouraged by military government."¹⁰

In contrast with their attitude toward a Japanese labor movement with which they were familiar, many of the Japan hands wished to postpone a decision on questions such as land reform until sometime during the Occupation. They were not alone in wanting to see what the situation on the ground would look like. Leo Pasvolksky, a special assistant to the secretary of state, told the PWC in November 1944 that it appeared as though "the President was anxious to avoid too many details concerning the economic policy for Germany as we did not know what conditions we will find" and that similar considerations would be applicable to Japan. This uncertainty as to what would be possible in Japan, as well as a desire to maintain operational control in Washington, is evident in the drafts of what became the economics section of SWNCC 150. In the words of one of these drafts: "except as they may be specifically directed, the occupation authorities should not take the initiative with respect to long-range reform or reorganization of the Japanese internal economy. Only where internally generated reform movements reach significant proportions, should the occupying forces consider taking any positive action with respect to them, and then only upon specific direction of the appropriate authorities in Washington." Long before this document reached the secretary of state's staff committee, however, this clause was dropped and the authority to take the initiative with regard to such matters as agrarian reform, implicitly conferred upon the Occupation.¹¹

On 6 June 1945 the IDACFE approved most of the draft economics section and informed its author, Edwin Martin, that a final draft could be submitted to the members for approval without another meeting. By this point, the clause maintaining control from Washington already appears to have been dropped. What remained was the injunction that

10. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 165, 15 November 1944 and attached Notes on PWC Meeting, 17 Nov. 1944, Iokibe, 2-B-146.

11. Notes on PWC Meeting, 17 Nov. 1944; and CAC-222a/PWC-296b revised, "Japan: Economic Policies During Military Occupation," 16 Mar./19 May 1945, both in *ibid*, 2-B-146, 2-A-66. See also Mayo, "American Economic Planning," 258n31.

"military government should encourage the development of democratic organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, and should favor a wider distribution of ownership, management and control of the Japanese economic system." On important issues, established practice within the IDACFE was to "continue discussion until a general consensus had been reached rather than abiding by a majority vote." Yet there is nothing in the IDACFE minutes to suggest opposition to Martin's language on this point. Nor is there evidence of opposition at the higher levels of planning with which Dooman, in particular, was involved. When the draft policy reached the secretary of state's staff committee on 26 June, it was presented by Joseph Ballantine who was then head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Grew was presiding over the meeting as the acting secretary of state. The economics section was approved not only without criticism, but without discussion. This was not because it had been successfully maneuvered past hostile Japan hands, but because it articulated a general agreement.¹²

Early Efforts and the Opponents of a "Soft" Peace

Turning to an examination of the origins of American support for land reform in Japan, one finds a member of the "Japan Crowd" developing the first relevant arguments in the presurrender planning documents. Although it is not clear that anything directly came of the work, Robert Fearey's E-155—"Japanese Post-War Economic Considerations"—was a prescient paper and appears to have been well received at the time. In a presentation based upon it, before the State Department's Subcommittee on Territorial Problems on 30 July 1943, Fearey argued his case that "certain essential reforms in agriculture and industry would have to be carried out before Japan could attain a stable economy after the war." After he had finished, Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University and the chairman of the subcommittee, "complimented Mr. Fearey on the clarity of his report, and remarked that rarely had a better statement been presented to the subcommittee by a member of the research staff."¹³

12. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 204, 6 June 1945; CAC-222a/PWC-296b revised, 16 Mar./19 May 1945; and, on the policy of reaching consensus, Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 105, 18 July 1944, all in Iokibe, 2-B-185, 2-A-66, 2-B-86. For Dooman's position, see boxes 131 and 110, SWNCC Records, RG 353, National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, D.C. SC-138, "Summary of United States' Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan." Minutes of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 26 June 1945. Records of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, microfilm, M-1054, reel 2 for SC-138, reel 3 for the minutes, also in NA.

13. Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, T Minutes 53 (30 July 1943), 11, 12, Iokibe, 1-C-3.

Fearey wrote that there were three main schools of thought on what should constitute policy toward Japan after the war. His purpose, in E-155, was to examine their economic implications. In retrospect, the positions of the first two schools could probably have been seriously advocated only in wartime. But they form an important part of the background against which the Japan hands advocated a "soft" peace. The first school held that security against future Japanese aggression required cutting Japan off from foreign trade and eliminating its modern industrial plant. The second would allow foreign trade, after a while, but would deprive Japan of its heavy industries and merchant marine. The third school of thought, while insisting on a disarmament that would perhaps include Japan's aircraft manufacturing and ship-building industries, held that a tolerable Japanese living standard was a prerequisite for turning Japan to a course of peaceful and orderly development.¹⁴

Given the large increase in population since the end of Japan's self-imposed seclusion, and given the fact that the law of diminishing returns had long since set in for agriculture—the total yield would be appreciably higher if the population pressure on the farming districts were reduced by a third—the conclusion was inescapable that under the first school's plan, "Standards of living would fall below the subsistence level and extinction of a fourth or more of the population would be rendered almost inevitable." Even under the second school's scheme, only the discovery of extensive new overseas markets for the products of Japan's light industries could prevent a sharp reduction in standards of living and very likely also in population.¹⁵

This established at the outset, the bulk of Fearey's paper was devoted to the assumption that American policy would follow the third school and the United States would undertake "to assist or actually to direct the rehabilitation and reform of [the] Japanese economy." In the future as in the past, Japan would be primarily dependent on foreign trade for its economic welfare. Here the primary questions were the willingness of other nations to accept Japanese exports in free or reasonably free competition, the future course of demand for Japan's traditional exports, and its prospects for developing new ones. Japan having become America's third largest export market in the 1920s, it was by no means entirely a matter of altruism for the United States to help Japan in attaining a minimum volume of trade. A further reduction in the silk trade appeared virtually certain, but there was good

14. Robert Fearey, E-155, "Japanese Post-War Economic Considerations," 21 July 1943, 1-2, *ibid.*, 1-B-18.

15. *Ibid.*, 4.

reason to believe that Japan “may be able to develop a substantial export trade in capital goods to the industrializing nations of the Far East.”¹⁶

While an extensive foreign trade was to be considered the first prerequisite for the constitution of a viable postwar economy, a scarcely less important precondition for the attainment of that goal would be an extensive development of the domestic market. Here Fearey suggested two of the measures later pursued by the Occupation: agrarian reform and *zaibatsu* dissolution. The basic cause of all the farmer’s ills was an overpopulation in the farming districts which could only be remedied with the expansion of industrial employment. The most promising field for reform was to be found in “the reduction of tenancy, the lowering of rents, and scaling down of the high land valuations upon which those rents are based.” In addition, agricultural cooperatives should be encouraged and steps taken to bring about a reduction of the farmer’s debt burden. The tax structure—which taxed a farmer twice as much as a merchant or an industrialist of the same income—would also have to be changed.¹⁷

Scarcely less important to Japan’s economic welfare than agrarian reform, Fearey continued, would be removal of the *zaibatsu* from the Japanese industrial scene. A large part of the income of these corporations had no other visible effect than to add to the resources of a few very wealthy families. Breaking up the *zaibatsu* would leave largely the same number and size of firms as before in the large-scale industries, but profits would be distributed among a much larger percentage of the people. In summary, thoroughgoing reform in industry and agriculture would bring about a higher level of per capita productivity, a wider distribution of the national wealth and income, and an increased level of general purchasing power, all of which would very greatly assist Japan in its efforts to achieve a tolerable standard of living.¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*, 2–14.

17. *Ibid.*, 15–17. In an intriguing reversal, a little more than half a year later, Fearey came out with a paper opposed to *zaibatsu* dissolution. The benefit to Japanese living standards, he now argued, from the advantages the *zaibatsu* provided for Japan’s international trade, outweighed the advantages their dissolution might bring. He remained convinced that the farming population, “unless their position were otherwise bettered would continue in a relationship of almost feudal subservience to landlord, usurer, and tax collector.” Robert Fearey, T-470, “Japan: The Large Family Concerns in Japanese Industry: Pre-War Structure and Power: Wartime Developments,” 25 March 1944, 24–27, *ibid.*, 1-B-33. In a letter to the author of 30 June 1990, Fearey expressed surprise at ever having opposed *zaibatsu* dissolution.

18. Fearey, E-155, 19–21.

On 24 August 1943, Grew wrote to Fearey that he had read with "keen interest" his papers on Japanese postwar economic considerations. The work, study and thought which had gone into these papers, Grew noted, was evident. Surely they had been and would be appreciated. There were so many imponderable factors, however, that it was difficult to get down to brass tacks. The course of the war and the nature of its conclusion, the duration of the war and the losses involved, the impact of the war on Japanese morale and the attitudes of other nations, each of these might fundamentally influence the eventual settlement. "But by and large," he told Fearey, "I find myself in the third of the three schools of thought mentioned in your Introductory Remarks in E-155."¹⁹

It is at this point in the narrative that Susan Deborah Chira, who has otherwise written one of the best accounts of American presurrender planning, goes seriously astray. Confusing Fearey's E-155 with his work on land reform in 1945, she compounds the error by mistakenly ascribing to Grew and Dooman the criticism which Fearey later recalled was directed against his proposals. Since Chira's book was originally a senior thesis at Harvard, and Edwin Reischauer her adviser, his description of Grew's opposition to land reform may also derive from this mistake. In the summer of 1943, the opposition that Fearey encountered came not from Grew, who was rather sympathetic, but from those generally opposed to a "soft" peace.²⁰

Before Grew replaced him on 1 May 1944, Stanley K. Hornbeck, an old China hand, was the director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs. At about the same time that Fearey was beginning to argue for having the Occupation direct the reform and rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, Hornbeck was claiming that aside from humanitarian considerations, there was no need to be greatly concerned with the postwar stability of that economy. "Whereas Germany was an integral part of Europe as a whole and while its economy could not be wrecked without wrecking that of the whole continent, Japan's position was very different. The Japanese played no significant role in the world economy or even that of the Far East, and if economic chaos were to be produced on its islands it could easily be restricted to Japan." In a letter critical of Fearey and his ideas, written toward the end of 1943, Hornbeck stressed that he believed that options should be kept open and that the focus should be on the real objective of eliminating the military cancer from the Japanese body politic. Toward that end it might be wise to try to remake Japan in America's

19. Grew to Fearey, 24 Aug. 1943, MSAm1687v. 115(43), Grew Papers.

20. Compare Chira, 76, and Robert Fearey, presentation at a symposium sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, 13-15 Apr. 1978, in Redford, ed., *Occupation of Japan*, 152.

image and it might be wise to let a demilitarized Japan work out its own future in its own way; "procedure along that line might or might not result in revolution and temporary chaos in Japan; revolution in Japan, if it came, might or might not be a good thing."²¹

The belief that a Japanese revolution might be for the best—a belief which would become part of the basis of opposition to the "Japan Crowd" and a "soft" peace—had been voiced as early as October 1942 by Willis Church Lamott, the director of missionary education for the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The "old liberals" in Japan, Lamott warned, "either have been assassinated, have died off or are passing the days of their senile decay behind the closely guarded gates of their estates." It was foolish to expect leadership from them and still more foolish to think that defeat would lead the Japanese to repudiate their beliefs in favor of such liberals. What the demobilization of soldiers and the agrarian problem would probably combine to produce was not Western style democracy, but revolution. It would be along the lines of the recent social experiments in the Soviet Union and China, "rather than the more doctrinaire conceptions of freedom and the rights of man obtaining in the democratic nations, that Japan will naturally seek her salvation." For all of the conflict and suffering that this would entail, in the end it would produce a nation rather than an inchoate mass of men and women ruled by a divine emperor.²²

This theme that a revolution was needed to sweep away Japan's archaic mental and feudal structures continued to be articulated well into 1945. Owen Lattimore, who suggested that the difference between "liberals" and "militarists" in Japan had only been a matter of timing, also stressed the need for a revolution.

It is a mistake to think that Japan could achieve "democratic monarchy" by reform. We Americans are likely to be misled by thinking of England as the example of a democratic monarchy. But one of the important reasons why the British can be democratic is that, at a time which has now receded so far into history that it can be talked about without discomfort, the English people cut off the head of an English king. Until the Japanese people have done something equally progressive (whatever the suitable equivalent of cutting off heads may be), everybody will be uncomfortable and no palliative reform will be adequate.²³

21. Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, T Minutes 52 (16 July 1943), 8, Iokibe, 1-C-2. Hornbeck to Bowman, 31 Dec. 1943, "Robert A. Fearey," box 165, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif. This letter does not appear to have been sent.

22. Willis Church Lamott, "What of Postwar Japan," *Asia* 42 (October 1942): 573-75.

23. Owen Lattimore, "The Sacred Cow of Japan," *Atlantic* 175 (Jan. 1945): 50.

For some of those who desired a Japanese revolution, any form of military occupation appeared to be counterproductive. John Embree, who was connected with the Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Chicago, argued that an occupation would provoke a backlash and strengthen the hand of those favoring traditional governmental forms. "Even if a revolutionary party or group were to survive the initial months of occupation, it is very likely that the occupying forces will do as they did in the Rhineland after the last war and tried to do in Russia—namely, suppress all thunder from the left. In other words, the announced policy of the United States to occupy Japan will tend to retard rather than advance the democratic process in that country."²⁴

Although hoping that a vast social revolutionary upheaval would occur in the postwar period—"burning away in its fires much of the dross of old Japan"—T. A. Bisson was unusual among the critics of the "Japan Crowd" in sharing a great many of its central assumptions. A vengeful postwar policy designed to maintain the political or economic subjugation of Japan, Bisson argued, would generate a perpetual threat to the peace of Asia. An effort to return Japan to an agrarian subsistence economy would result in the death by starvation of a quarter of the population and persons advocating such methods were evading the real task of establishing a Japan which could cooperate with other nations. Defeat would help to discredit the old Japanese leadership and their program and facilitate the emergence of a new leadership which would undertake basic reforms. This new leadership should be supported and Japan given full opportunity to raise the living standard of its people through the processes of normal international trade. Reparations should be limited, perhaps to the transfer of Japanese assets abroad. Like Fearey, Bisson was convinced that agrarian reform was a prerequisite to the establishment of a healthy Japanese economy.²⁵

Bisson differed from the "Japan Crowd" in that he explicitly blamed the large landlords and the *zaibatsu* as well as the military for Japan's aggression and stressed the need to abolish the emperor institution. But even here, the differences involved should not be exaggerated or misconstrued. The core of Grew's position was certainly not—as Bisson would later charge—some special sympathy for Emperor Hirohito, the landlords or the *zaibatsu*. After Japan's surrender, Grew could write of Hirohito in a private letter that "he ought to be tried as a war criminal." What Grew believed was that the institution of the throne could

24. John F. Embree, "Democracy in Postwar Japan," *American Journal of Sociology* 50 (November 1944): 207.

25. T. A. Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 42 (March 1944): 24, 8, 10, 11, 14, 9, 22.

be used to advance a liberal agenda—including ultimately land reform and *zaibatsu* dissolution—while maintaining political stability. For Bisson, political stability was simply not a central value and the emperor was a primary representative of what needed to be overthrown. Like William C. Johnstone, the dean of the School of Government at George Washington University, Bisson believed that the pursuit of stability could have reactionary implications. Johnstone put the matter succinctly in a paper prepared for the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in January 1945:

The United Nations may become so anxious to avoid chaos, civil strife or revolution in Japan as to be willing to compromise the ultimate goal of a transformed Japan for the short-term advantage of a false stability. Japan must not be permitted to follow the same course as Germany did after World War I, and the continuance in power of any groups among Japan's civilian bosses—big business monopolists, bureaucrats, politicians or nobility—could fatally compromise the nation's transformation into a law-abiding state and risk a renewal of Japanese aggression at their first opportunity.²⁶

The public criticism that was directed against Grew, and the Japan hands generally, often focussed precisely on this question of where the postwar Japanese leadership should come from. In general, the assumption was that the “Japan Crowd” was devoted to what Johnstone called “civilian bosses.” Grew, the editors of *Amerasia* were convinced, looked only to “prominent civilian members of the ruling oligarchy.” In fact, as Akira Iriye has shown, the Japan hands did feel a strong affinity for the Japanese statesmen of the so-called Anglo-American school and expect that many of them would be important allies after the war. But their attitude toward the Japanese labor movement indicates that they also looked well beyond this group. In a letter to Hornbeck of 30 September 1943, Grew made it clear that he was not simply thinking of some sort of restoration to power of moderate elements from the prewar period. The impact of the war, he wrote, “may have converted some or many of our old friends among the moderates to rabid extremists whose reconversion may be difficult or impossible.” It was simply not possible at that stage of the war to know who there would be to work with when the war was over. “I will however say this: I have constantly held that when, through defeat in war and postwar measures, the Japanese military caste and cult have been rendered powerless, elements will be found in Japan

26. Grew to Elsie and Cecil Lyon, 30 Sept. 1945, MSA1687 v. 122(26), Grew Papers. William C. Johnstone, *The Future of Japan American Council Paper* (New York, 1945), no. 5:28.

who will welcome and who will cooperate in the building of a new and nonmilitary structure, so long as they are not denied hope for the future."²⁷

The element of contingency involved in presurrender planning deserves to be stressed. Final decisions on such structural economic reforms as *zaibatsu* dissolution and land reform did not begin to be taken until it was clear—after Japan's surrender—that there would be a cooperative Japanese government through which the Occupation could rule and through which it could accomplish much more than it could as a straightforward military government. It was precisely such a military government, with its severe limitations in the way of trained personnel fluent in Japanese, which the presurrender planners had to assume in their planning. Had Bisson been in Fearey's position in 1943 or early 1944, his ideas about agrarian reform would probably have received a similar response both from Grew and from the overall planning bureaucracy: interesting thought, save it for later. Perhaps someone would have pointed out to him that if the problem were framed as he had cast it—as one between 3,547 "big" landlords and 5.5 million tenants and small holders—it was a problem without a solution. Bisson's "big" landlords (those with holdings of over 122.5 acres) held a small percentage of Japan's arable land. In any case, the dominant issues of the economic policy drafts of 1944, and even much of 1945, remained such immediate occupation concerns as the control of inflation, the destruction of war material, and the provision of relief. The belief that a healthy Japanese economy was a prerequisite to a favorable reorientation of Japanese attitudes, and the corollary that reforms should be designed to strengthen that economy, were not universally shared. As early as April 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had reminded the Post-War Programs Committee that "the American people are not now in a mood to be too considerate of Japan. The emphasis should be placed on the conversion of Japan to a law abiding, peacefully disposed nation; until the Japanese have shown evidence of having reformed, they should be accorded only the necessary minimum of consideration."²⁸

27. "The Dangerous Myth of the 'Moderates,'" *Amerasia* 8 (June 1944), 184. Most of the Japan hands would probably not have cared for Okano Susumu, the head of the Japanese People's Liberation Alliance, who *Amerasia* touted for postwar leadership. See "Potential Anti-Fascist Forces in Japan," *Amerasia* 8 (August 1944): 227. But see also note 45 below. Akira Iriye, "Continuities in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1941-1949" in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1977), 378-407. Grew to Hornbeck, 30 Sept. 1943, MSAm1687 v. 116(17), Grew Papers.

28. See the various versions of CAC-222, "Japan: Economic Policies During Military Occupation," and the Minutes of PWC Meeting No. 21, 14 Apr. 1944, Iokibe, 2-A-61 to 2-A-66, 2-D-1. See Bisson, "Price of Peace," 15.

From Washington to Tokyo

In December 1944, Edward Stettinius replaced Hull as secretary of state and Grew was appointed undersecretary. The Post-War Programs Committee was superseded by the newly established State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and, in January, what became known as SWNCC's Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE) was set up with Dooman as its chairman. Yet in spite of the Japan hands' ascendancy, the critics of a "soft" peace continued to exercise a strong influence. In April 1945, a statement of general economic policy toward Japan was torpedoed by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson on the grounds that it was poorly written and represented the same kind of "soft peace" that had gotten the State Department into trouble over policy toward Germany. According to Acheson, "it seemed absurd to recommend that we should see that Japan has a vigorous international trade so that it can pay reparations." The Japan hands' position was strengthened somewhat by the presence of "soft" peace advocates in the American military. In early August, Colonel William Chanler, the acting director of the Civil Affairs Division, sent Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson a series of proposed amendments for SWNCC 150. These included the recommendation that any "statements suggesting vindictiveness beyond our specific requirements should be eliminated, particularly since we must leave the way open for the revival of Japanese political and economic life on a demilitarized basis and for developing in Japan friendly attitudes toward the United States." In a letter of late July, Colonel Thomas D. Roberts had already complained that SWNCC 150 "falls off on the economic side of the vital question of what the U.S. really wishes Japan to become—for instance, do we wish to run the risk of allowing depressed conditions in postwar Japan to force the Japanese middle and lower classes into Communism?"²⁹

The consensus position that finally emerged was the version of SWNCC 150 approved before Dooman retired from the State Department at the end of August 1945. This document required the Occupation to facilitate the restoration of the Japanese economy while at the same time stressing that the primary responsibility would fall on the Japanese themselves:

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic

29. For the text that Acheson was criticizing, see SC-101, 17 Apr. 1945; see also Minutes of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 23 and 30 Apr. 1945; all in *Iokibe*, 5-C-4, 5-C-13, 5-C-15. Chanler to secretary of war, 6 Aug. 1945. Roberts to Lincoln, 25 July 1945. Both letters are in ABC 014 Japan, 13 Apr. 1944, sec. 7, RG 165, NA.

difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adopted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.³⁰

It was at the meeting of SWNCC at which this language was approved that Dooman proposed that the SFE be authorized to request funding from the State Department to obtain "the best qualified opinion" on a paper drafted by Undersecretary of the Navy Artemus Gates. This paper, a "Positive Policy for the Reorientation of the Japanese," appears to be the only articulate call for using the Occupation to conduct a program of radical reform in Japan among the presurrender planning documents. The aims that were implicit in many of the more narrowly focused planning papers, and in the overall consensus that the democratization of Japan was to be encouraged, Gates made explicit in this paper. America's objective, he argued, should not be to "recast the culture of the Japanese, but rather to use it, as far as possible, in establishing new attitudes of mind conforming to the basic principles of democracy and fair dealing." All SWNCC papers should be reviewed in the light of this objective and all Occupation activities integrated with a program to achieve it. In seeking this reorientation of Japanese culture, use was to be made of the high value the Japanese placed on education. All Japanese, and not merely the young, were to be presented with materials to encourage rethinking, especially materials about the outside world. Principles of self-government and individual responsibility were to be emphasized as well as the dangers to individual freedom and international peace inherent in tyrannical governmental forms. Many of the older ethical standards of Japanese home and family life could be supported, but it would also be important to ensure equal educational opportunities for women. As the power of the Japanese oligarchy and the ready acceptance of Japanese militarism on the part of the population rested in part on depressed economic conditions, and as a gradual improvement in the living standards of ordinary Japanese was essential to the success of reeducation, appropriate agrarian and economic reforms would be an inte-

30. SWNCC 150/3, 22 Aug. 1945, box 603, Records of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, RG 165, NA.

gral part of the program. Gates also suggested that there were other “interested elements” who would take advantage of an American failure, and that the probable result of such a failure would be “the development of a political hegemony inimical to the best interests of the United States and the future peace of the world.”³¹

Although a modified version of Gates’s paper was not adopted until early 1946, it is worth considering the response his draft received when presented to the IDACFE. There was general agreement among the committee members that the ideas expressed in the paper were valuable, but there was also what can legitimately be referred to as a “conservative” concern that the program outlined was too ambitious to be practicable. The following paragraph, which the committee adopted, makes it clear that this conservatism was not rooted in any hostility to reform:

It is recognized that any basic change in the ideology and thinking of the Japanese cannot be forced upon them from the outside, if such reforms are to have lasting value, but must be acceptable to the Japanese themselves. Consequently, military government will be faced with the extremely difficult task of not simply drawing up a reform program and insisting on its acceptance but rather of convincing the Japanese that certain basic reforms are desirable and necessary and should be instituted by them.³²

Much of the presurrender planning that did take place with regard to long-range reform came about as a result of an early 1945 effort to approach Occupation issues systematically. On 5 February 1945, SWNCC’s Subcommittee on the Far East appointed a subcommittee of its own to formulate an agenda of topics to be worked on in order of priority. The initial list, circulated for the consideration of SWNCC two weeks later, included under paragraph VI(10), “Adjustments in Systems of Land Tenure.” Notice of the problem was undoubtedly taken at the higher level for in approving the initial list of topics, SWNCC was particularly concerned with paragraph VI(10), adding to it: “Nature and Extent of Industrial Control,” “Education,” and “Control of Public Information.”³³

31. Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of SWNCC, 31 Aug. 1945, box 238, Combined Chiefs of Staff Decimal File, 1942–1945, RG 218, NA. SWNCC 162/D, 19 July 1945, “Positive Policy for the Reorientation of the Japanese,” 2–7, in ABC 014 Japan, 13 Apr. 1944, sec. 4, RG 165, NA.

32. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 214, 30 July 1945, Iokibe, 2-B-195.

33. SWNCC-PFESC, Minutes, Meeting No. 1, 5 Feb. 1945, microfilm, T 1198, 1 roll. SWNCC 16/2, Appendix A, 19 Feb. 1945, and SWNCC to SFE, 24 Feb. 1945, also in SWNCC 16 series, microfilm, LM-54, roll 2, NA.

On 7 April 1945, the SFE suggested that in accordance with the approved list of topics, SWNCC should request from the Department of State a paper which would include: "(1) a brief statement of the pre-war situation in Japanese rural land tenure; and (2) policies which should be followed, depending upon the conditions which may develop during the period of military occupation." This proposal was accepted by SWNCC on 23 April and became SWNCC 100. On 1 May, Fearey finished the preliminary versions of PR-12 and PR-13, two papers apparently designed to meet the SWNCC requirement. The first was a ten-page description of "The Japanese Agrarian Problem." The second, "Japan: Occupation Period: Agrarian Reform," contained possible courses of action.³⁴

Fearey argued in PR-13 that besides the contribution agrarian reform would make to achieving reasonably satisfactory living standards, it was in line with established plans recommending the "elimination of ultra-nationalistic influences" and the "strengthening of liberal thought and democratic processes" in Japan. The farming class could least be ignored in a program for the conversion of the Japanese people from militaristic to peaceful tendencies. They comprised close to 45 percent of the population and had, largely because of their poverty and discontent, been a more sincere and constant source of support of the military program than any other class. In comparison with E-155, the analysis and recommendations that Fearey presented in these papers were much more clearly developed. It appears to have been in the interim that he met the *éminence grise* of the Japanese land reform—Wolf Ladejinsky.³⁵

Born in 1899 in Ekaterinopol, a predominantly Jewish community in the Ukraine, Ladejinsky came of age as the Bolsheviks were coming to power. He brought to a life-long career of land reform advocacy not only a concern for the peasantry and a great expertise, but also a deep awareness of the ease with which severe agrarian problems could be exploited by political extremists. Lenin, he observed in an article on the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, was aware of the fact that the October Revolution would not have triumphed without peasant

34. SWNCC 100, microfilm, LM-54, roll 11; Robert A. Fearey, PR-12 preliminary, "The Japanese Agrarian Problem" and PR-13 preliminary, "Japan: Occupation Period: Agrarian Reform," Harley A. Notter File, box 119a, NA. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 464n74.

35. Fearey, PR-13, 1–2. The best account of Ladejinsky's role, especially in the crucial months of 1946 when the Japanese government's initial proposal was dramatically strengthened, is to be found in Chira, 91–106. See Louis J. Walinsky, ed., *Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf I. Ladejinsky* (New York, 1977). See also Al McCoy, "Land Reform as Counter-Revolution," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 3 (Winter-Spring 1971): 14–49.

support and that it was the Bolsheviks' land to the tiller decree which had won that support. The articles like this one which won Ladejinsky his reputation in the 1930s were mostly technical studies of land tenure and agricultural issues in such countries as Russia, Japan, and India. Yet they all included a reference to the political dimension of agrarian problems. In 1944, while working for the Department of Agriculture, Ladejinsky was asked to author a Civil Affairs Handbook for the American military on Japanese agriculture. In it, he called attention to the revolutionary implications of the agrarian problem in Japan. Japanese tenants and part-tenants had been a "hotbed for extremist political movements on the part of the Army." Agrarian unrest had provided no small part of the stimulus to Japan's foreign policy. It would be well, therefore, to consider the possibilities presented by a defeated army largely composed of farmers and farmers' sons. "The drastic agrarian changes in the countries of central and eastern Europe, following the military defeats in the First World War," he warned, "furnish a precedent that cannot be ignored."³⁶

Studying agrarian reform generally and land reform in Japan in particular, Fearey soon came upon Ladejinsky's name: "After reading some of his pieces, I got to know him. I had many pleasant evenings in his apartment (he was a bachelor and a music lover; we used to listen to music and talk about the Japanese agrarian situation). Then I started to write. I showed him successive drafts of an analysis of the Japanese farm problem and proposed reform measures."³⁷

This was the origin of PR-13. The basic choice Fearey presented in this paper was between efforts to improve the conditions of tenancy and a program for the expropriation of all rented farmland—with compensation based on the land's productive value—and the transfer of that land to the tenants free and without lien of any kind. The first alternative, an effort to improve tenancy conditions, would be self-defeating. Under present conditions the exceptionally high prices at which land was sold in Japan meant that most landlords earned only a moderate return on investment. Faced with reforms which would greatly reduce or eliminate this return, many landlords would till the land themselves or else sell it. In either case, the decision would result

36. W. Ladejinsky, "Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union," *Political Science Quarterly* 49 (March 1934), 2, 7. Army Service Forces Manual M354-7, Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, sec. 7: Agriculture (1 Apr. 1944), Iokibe, 37, 189. Among Ladejinsky's articles in the 1930s are: "Farm Tenancy and Japanese Agriculture," *Foreign Agriculture* (September 1937); "Soviet State Farms," *Political Science Quarterly* (March and June 1938); "Agrarian Unrest in Japan," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1939); "Agricultural Problems of India," *Foreign Agriculture* (August 1939).

37. Fearey, presentation at a symposium, in Redford, ed., *Occupation*, 151–52.

in mass evictions among the tenants the reform was attempting to help. Moreover, even a rent reduction of 50 percent would still leave many peasants without an adequate income. "Finally, since there would have been no fundamental change in landlord-tenant relationships (i.e. for the tenants who were not evicted) the landlords, because of the continuing scarcity of land and multiplicity of farmers seeking land to till, would still possess every advantage in dealing with their tenants, and would probably succeed in gradually restoring the former conditions of tenancy."³⁸

Unfortunately, unlike most of the other papers in the PR series, there is no discussion of PR-13 in the IDACFE minutes. It was in corridors and informal conversations, Fearey has recalled, that his critics among the Japan hands "poured cold water" over his position. In a letter of 1 June 1945 to Edwin Martin, Fearey explained that since sending members of the economic divisions copies of PR-13, he had revised his views in the light of "Messrs. Dickover's, Williams', Johansen's and others' criticisms." He was personally still of the opinion that the Occupation should "assume greater initiative in the matter," but proposed that the principles "which have been supported by those with whom I have discussed the matter in recent weeks, be accepted as the basis of approach to the problem." These principles constitute the bulk of Fearey's letter and can be summarized as follows:

(1) "There should be no attempt at comprehensive agrarian reform in the immediate post-hostilities period, i.e. probably for six months or more."

(2) At the end of the emergency period the occupation authorities should take note of any spontaneous movements for agrarian reform. A substantial reform movement not strongly opposed by other classes—with the exception of the landlords—should, with the approval of Washington, be offered encouragement and support.

(3) In order for the military government to be able to properly appraise, and, if appropriate, to guide the preparation of any reform program to be initiated under its authority, a tentative reform program should be drawn up by State, Agriculture and possibly other departments and agencies.

(4) "Japanese leaders desirous of instituting a program of agrarian reform would be told during the above mentioned emergency period that a program which appeared to be widely supported by the Japanese people would receive the blessing and support of the military government."³⁹

38. Fearey, PR-13, 10–16.

39. Interview with Robert Fearey (12 June 1990, Washington, D.C.). Erle Dickover, Frank Williams, and Beppo Johansen were in charge of the Division of Japanese Affairs, commonly attended IDACFE meetings, and were all old Japan hands. Fearey to Martin,

The most important thing for the present, Fearey told Martin, "is that the problem be thoroughly studied by the appropriate agencies of the Government and that we be prepared for whatever course may be decided upon later." Martin, for his part, was in no more of a hurry on the question of land reform than Fearey's critics among the Japan hands. He became chief of the State Department's Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs on 20 October 1945 and a month later produced an outline of his division's policy program. Under the heading of "Basic Reforms" for Japan, he listed as his last point: "Agricultural Reform—SWNCC 100 Paper in suspension—not urgent and no one available competent to handle." In other words, while there appears to have been a general agreement among the presurrender planners, Japan hands and non-Japan hands alike, that a postwar land reform in Japan would be desirable, there was uncertainty as to its feasibility and little sense of need for prompt action.⁴⁰

In spite of the fact that PR-13 was not adopted, and the fact that the land reform section of Ladejinsky's Civil Affairs Guide was deleted, planning for a possible agrarian reform continued. In an article written in 1951, Mark Williamson, who became deputy chief of the Agriculture Division of the Natural Resources Section of the Occupation, recalled the situation: "Considerable research and background material had been prepared in Washington by various government agencies; and during the presurrender spring and summer of 1945 at the Civil Affairs staging area for the Occupation of Japan at the Presidio of Monterey, California, a unit of trained agriculturalists had been at work full time studying Japanese agriculture and preparing, discussing, and revising tentative plans for agricultural programs that might need to be instituted by the Occupation Force upon its entry into the country."⁴¹

Williamson was one of those working at the Presidio of Monterey. Like Fearey, he was in contact with Ladejinsky, but the proposals and arguments that he and his colleagues put together were not as fully

n.d. but clear from context, misfiled by four years as 894.52/6-149, microfilm, LM 105, roll 28, NA. Fearey has recalled that Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee were "very interested" in his ideas about land reform, while Eugene Dooman and Joseph Ballantine were "skeptical." Fearey, presentation to the symposium, in Redford, ed., *Occupation*, 152.

40. Martin to Rubin, 27 Nov. 1945, in *Correspondence of the United States Political Adviser for Japan*, Vol. 2, microfilm, Japan, POLAD, roll 653FA, Washington National Record Center (hereafter WNRC), Suitland, MD; also quoted in Mayo, "American Economic Planning," 262n42.

41. In his letter to Martin of 1 June 1945, Fearey refers to the deletion of the land reform section of Ladejinsky's Civil Affairs Guide at a meeting on 28 May. Mark B. Williamson, "Land Reform in Japan," *Journal of Farm Economics* 33 (May 1951): 170.

developed as those of PR-13. A paper of late summer spoke in general terms of such things as increasing the number of independent owners, limiting rental rates, establishing a minimum tenure of ten years, and insisting that all tenure agreements be made in writing. The rationale presented, while bearing affinities with Fearey's arguments, was not as forceful or lucid:

The existing social economic structure of Japanese Agriculture and the Governmental pattern which maintains it are essentially antisocial in nature, conducive to social unrest, and potentially detrimental to world peace aims. The improvement of conditions among Japanese farmers through a gradual relaxation of existing controls, the institution of basic agrarian reforms, the promotion of democratic organizations among farmers and the encouragement of a wider distribution in the ownership of farm lands must ultimately become the very basis of any agricultural program in Japan.⁴²

When the issue of land reform was raised with the Natural Resources Section of the Occupation in November 1945, Williamson's boss, Major Warren H. Leonard, replied that basic agrarian reforms in Japan were long overdue but that food problems were more pressing at the moment and that it was "planned to have Dr. Wolf Ladejinsky make a detail[ed] study of the subject. He is expected to join the staff of the Agriculture Division of this section as a civilian consultant sometime during November."⁴³

The document that caused the issue of land reform to be raised with the Natural Resources Section, and which changed the tempo and perhaps the course of Occupation policy with respect to land reform, was a combined and revised version of PR-12 and PR-13. Fearey had been assigned to work with George Atcheson, the political advisor to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and shortly after arriving in Japan had asked him for a few days in which to improve his paper:

Atcheson asked me to let him look at it; I did, and he afforded me the time to polish it up. He read it, and said that we would send it to General MacArthur. So I drafted a brief covering memorandum for him to use for that purpose. I remember that several days later I was in my office when a couple of colonels from SCAP came bursting through the door. One of them said, "Are you Fearey?" (I wondered what I had

42. See Chira, 77-80. "Plan for Administration and Control of Agricultural Affairs by Military Government in Japan," 14 Aug. 1945, folder: "Publications," box 8819, Natural Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC.

43. Warren H. Leonard, memorandum for the record, 4 November 1945, File 313, Box 8968, Natural Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC. Ladejinsky did not actually arrive until December.

done wrong.) I said “Yes.” He said, “General MacArthur took your farm reform program home last night and was very taken by it. He has asked us to work with you on a directive ordering the Japanese government to carry out a land reform program on the lines recommended in your study.”⁴⁴

Issued on 9 December 1945, SCAP 411 directed the Japanese government to come up with a land reform program by 15 March 1946 and offered guidance as to what that program should include. Both in its description of the problem and in its delineation of the general requirements for a successful reform, it borrowed heavily from what has come to be known as the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum. Fearey’s recollections on the influence of that memorandum are congruent with the history of the land reform put out by the Natural Resources Section during the Occupation: “In the latter part of October 1945, General MacArthur was furnished a comprehensive statement of the farm tenancy situation, outlining the need for a vigorous reorganization of tenure arrangements and suggesting specific means for effecting it. . . . Thus within a few weeks General MacArthur received on the one hand full authority for correcting undemocratic economic arrangements in Japan, and on the other hand, a documented indictment of the undemocratic land tenure system.”⁴⁵

A reevaluation of General Douglas MacArthur’s role as supreme commander for the allied powers, and an increased awareness of the importance of presurrender planning to Occupation policy, has been a valuable contribution of the recent literature. Yet while it is true that MacArthur and his staff played a smaller role in planning the initial goals of the Occupation than was once thought, and while it is also true that the widespread consensus that change was necessary and the pressures of the Japanese advocates and opponents of reform were of great importance, the role of MacArthur’s convictions should not be entirely overlooked. Particularly as regards the decision to support land reform, alternative courses of action were available. SWNCC 150

44. See Chief, CI&E to Chief, Natural Resources Section, 1 Nov. 1945; Chief, Natural Resources Section to Chief, CI&E, 6 Nov. 1945; file 313, box 8968, Natural Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC. Fearey, presentation at a symposium, Redford, ed., *Occupation*, 153.

45. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., *Japanese Land Reform Program* (Tokyo, 1950), 15. For the text of the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum of 26 Oct. 1945, and the text of SCAP 411, see Walinsky, 569–80. What Chira calls SCAP’s “official silence” on land reform before 26 October is indicative of the memorandum’s importance. See Chira, 130n26. It should be noted that one of the ideas in PR-13 that was dropped from the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum was the idea that “Japanese communists now living and working with the Chinese communists on the continent may be of assistance.” See Fearey PR-13, 6.

did not explicitly mandate land reform and the course of action which MacArthur adopted was not without critics. In July 1946, Ladejinsky described a conversation he had held with Major General Archer L. Lerch, the military governor in Korea. "The clear-cut impression gained by this observer is that to General Lerch the very word 'reform' is suspect; that reform partakes of communism, and that those who advocate land reform are not altogether free of communism." "If the intensification of small-scale farming is achieved," warned the *Nippon Hyōron* from elsewhere on the political spectrum, "then at best Japan will become a silk-producing colony of the United States. Such a program would wed agricultural areas to feudalism and reaction." As against such views, MacArthur argued that the land reform would give rise to "a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalist economy of which it will then form an integral part."⁴⁶

In retrospect, as John W. Dower and others have suggested, the success of the land reform was dependent on a variety of factors largely beyond the control of the Americans: "That the vast majority of the rural population welcomed such a drastic transformation of relations was of course essential, but the reform was also facilitated by two additional circumstances. First, there existed a cadre of Japanese academics and former wartime bureaucrats who were themselves committed to land reform, and possessed the technical and administrative expertise to carry it out. And second, it quickly became apparent that wartime developments, especially after 1940, had severely eroded the traditional power of the landlords."⁴⁷

By August 1950, some 4,748,000 tenants had purchased close to 5 million acres of rice land and upland. This land had earlier been acquired from roughly 2,341,000 landlords. The government, which served as middleman, offered long term bonds as compensation to the former owners. But postwar inflation, which greatly helped the tenants to purchase and improve their land by wiping out their debts, meant that these bonds were of little value.⁴⁸

46. Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in Korea," 4 July 1946, box 8968, Natural Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC. *Nippon Hyōron* quoted in Harold Strauss, "MacArthur in the Paddy Fields," *Nation*, 9 Nov. 1946. MacArthur to Gipson, 24 Jan. 1948, RG 5: SCAP, Official Correspondence, January–December 1947, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va.; also quoted in Chira, 59.

47. John W. Dower, "The Useful War," *Daedalus* 119 (Summer 1990), 61. To this list, Ladejinsky would certainly have added the land commissions that actually handled the 30 to 40 million pieces of land involved. Wolf I. Ladejinsky, "Land Reform in Japan: A Comment," in Kenneth H. Parsons et al., eds., *Land Tenure* (Madison, Wisc., 1956), 227.

48. R. P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan* (London, 1959), 174.

Conclusion

The Japan hands were generally optimistic, although in retrospect not unreasonably so, that Japanese militarism could be extirpated. It seems likely, as Akira Iriye has suggested, that their optimism was in part derived "from a perception of the 1920s as a decade of peaceful cooperation between Japan and the Western democracies." But the charge first raised by their contemporary critics that they were only interested in some sort of "restoration," and were hostile to economic reform, is a charge that cannot withstand scrutiny. Joseph Grew, the central figure in the "Japan Crowd," clearly favored economic as well as political reform and thought that the former would strengthen the latter. Judging by the consensus language of SWNCC 150 the same point can be made for the Japan hands generally. Certainly as far as the promotion of the Japanese labor movement is concerned, Eugene Dooman shared this view. Land reform was perhaps the single most important of the Occupation's economic reforms and Robert Fearey played a key role in bringing it into being. Yet these figures continue to be described in the terms of their contemporary critics as opponents of a "New Deal" for Japan.⁴⁹

Most of those involved in presurrender planning, Japan hands and non-Japan hands alike, wanted to see what the situation on the ground would look like before committing themselves to the kind of thoroughgoing land reform program that Wolf Ladejinsky and Robert Fearey advocated. This should not obscure the underlying agreement among these planners on the desirability of economic reform or the significance of the fact that Ladejinsky's and Fearey's views could circulate in an articulate and persuasive form soon after the conditions the Occupation would encounter had been clarified. By August 1945, there was a broad consensus among those planning for the Occupation on the need for fundamental reform in Japan. Almost everyone involved, with greater or lesser degrees of optimism, hoped to see the emergence in Japan of a more liberal and democratic, and therefore a more peaceful and responsible, society. Defeat would be conducive to rethinking among the Japanese and the programs and policies carried out by the Occupation would further the process of reorientation. It was against the background of this consensus, which the Japan hands had helped to establish, that land reform would be adopted. A distinction might be drawn between those planners, such as Artemus Gates, who were convinced that the United States should export democracy to Japan and most of the Japan hands who knew that there were democratic tendencies in Japan that should be strengthened. Yet

49. On the optimism of the Japan hands, see Iriye, *Power and Culture*, 209.

as the period of presurrender planning drew to a close a considerable convergence of opinion was apparent. The common assumption was that the United States would find, as Grew put it, "plenty of co-operation in starting that misguided country towards a New Deal."⁵⁰

Epilogue

The interpretation presented here has stressed the sense of contingency that dominated presurrender planning and the broad areas of agreement which nonetheless emerged. It has suggested that the role that the Japan hands played in the planning process has been needlessly obscured by the erroneous assumption—which can be traced to their contemporary critics—that they were opposed to the economic and social reform of Japanese society. An additional part of the difficulty in seeing their wartime views clearly has been a tendency to read the later views of some of the Japan hands themselves back into the period of presurrender planning. In this way, and particularly for Eugene Dooman, an unwarranted antireformist continuity of opinion has been created.

Beginning in late 1948, Dooman helped to launch a public campaign to suggest that measures subversive of the Japanese economy had been smuggled into SWNCC 150 by his successor as chairman of the SFE, a China hand named John Carter Vincent. Just after he had left the State Department, Dooman maintained, Vincent must have added the passages in that document designed to bring about the dissolution of large industrial and banking combinations and a purge of the Japanese economic leadership. In the words of Harry F. Kern, a *Newsweek* editor and Dooman's collaborator in this effort, these covert passages in SWNCC 150 became the basis for measures which, whether their sponsors knew it or not, "at least paralleled a worldwide attack against the existing business structure by the extreme left." In fact, the revisions in question were approved at the same meeting of SWNCC at which Dooman suggested that Artemus Gates's paper should receive careful attention. The redrafting had been completed more than a week before under the direction of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. But Dooman's faulty recollection, as Gary May points out, did not prevent him from telling this same story to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Senator Patrick McCarran's Subcommittee on Internal Security, and a State Department Loyalty-Security Board.⁵¹

50. Grew to Harriman, 9 Sept. 1945, MSAm1687 v. 122(3), Grew Papers.

51. Harry F. Kern, "Significance of a Switch: End of an Extremist Plan for Japan,"

In his memoirs, Joseph Ballantine also maintained that "new provisions," inconsistent with the spirit of earlier SWNCC 150 drafts, were adopted after Dooman retired. Without mentioning Vincent, he described the ascendancy of a group that favored "extreme treatment of Japan: deposition of the Emperor, a thorough 'purge' of existing leaders; a comprehensive recasting of its economic organization, and sweeping 'reforms' in its political and social institutions." But while Ballantine exaggerated the practical differences between the Japan hands and their successors, the element of conspiracy is absent in his account. Unlike Dooman, he had little difficulty in seeing lasting benefits in many of the reforms ultimately carried out under the Occupation. In terms of agrarian reform, he was particularly impressed with the establishment of agricultural extension services, systematic crop reporting and "facilities for crop storage and for credits, which will render the farmers more independent of usurious money lenders." "If we'd given compensation," he concluded in an oral history, "it would have been all right."⁵²

As far as Dooman was concerned, agrarian reform was first and foremost a means of "effectively pauperizing an element which could be counted on to resist the communists." It was of a piece with other measures which had, he asserted, "eliminated from the Japanese

Newsweek, 20 Dec. 1948, 30. An edited draft of Kern's article is in Dooman's papers under the title "American Policy Toward Japan: Summary," n.d., folder: "US Foreign Relations—Japan," box 2, Eugene H. Dooman Papers (hereafter Dooman Papers), Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif. The text of SWNCC 150/3 of 22 Aug. 1945 is in box 603, Records of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, RG 165; the minutes for the SWNCC meeting of 31 Aug. 1945 are in box 238, Combined Chiefs of Staff Decimal File, 1942–1945, RG 218, both in NA. Gary May, *China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, D.C., 1979), 249. According to May, Kern's collaboration with Dooman began a year before in the campaign against directive FEC 230's program for economic deconcentration. See *Newsweek*, 1 Dec. 1947, 36–38. But whatever the virtues or flaws of FEC 230, it was after its fate was decided that Dooman's public attack on Vincent began. On the postwar controversy over the China hands generally, see Ernest R. May, "The China Hands in Perspective: Ethics, Diplomacy, and Statecraft," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *The China Hands' Legacy* (Boulder, Colo., 1987), 97–123.

52. Joseph W. Ballantine, *Memoirs, 1888–1970* (unpublished), 267–68, 292, box 1, Joseph W. Ballantine Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Joseph W. Ballantine, "Oral History," 81, Special Collections, Columbia University, New York. Even advocates of "revolution" who went on to serve in the Occupation, such as T. A. Bisson, soon realized that the Occupation's reforms did not constitute a "revolutionary" program. Their own programmatic ideas lacked the depth and strength of those that had been through the process of mobilizing a consensus during the period of presurrender planning and in a sense never got off the ground. As late as the summer of 1945, Bisson was still thinking in terms of such half-baked notions as the "nationalization of all large peace-time industrial plants." Bisson, "What Program for Japan?" 28. For Bisson's disillusionment with the Occupation, see Schonberger, 90–110.

economy its brains, experience and leadership, and impoverished hundreds of thousands of business executives and others of what might be called the capitalist class." Since Dooman's later views appear to have helped obscure the perspective he actually held while in government, some examination of their origin and their relationship to his earlier views is in order. When Grew retired after Japan's surrender, it was at the end of a full career. Dooman, in contrast, retired only after he heard that Dean Acheson had been appointed undersecretary of state. It was at this point, Dooman told William R. Castle, that "he realized that there was nothing more for him to do in the Department." In addition to this active dislike of Acheson, there is no doubt that Dooman viewed his own replacement as the advocate of a punitive peace. This was not entirely without cause. On 6 October 1945, Vincent participated in a radio address in which he naively suggested that one could "reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war." Even after much Japanese heavy industry had been cut back or wiped out—including the production of iron and steel, chemicals, machine tools, electrical and automotive equipment—he maintained that Japan could still solve its economic problems by placing emphasis on "farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods." Dooman was both frustrated and horrified. The implication of Vincent's position, if seriously pursued, was mass starvation. Quoting Vincent's speech a month later to the Worcester Foreign Policy Association he protested that "Economic security is essential to the development of democracy. I believe that that has been the basic principle of the New Deal."⁵³

Dooman's address on this occasion, before he had become completely embittered, is perhaps the closest approximation we have to a detailed presentation of his thinking before he left office. The purpose of the Occupation, he told his audience, was not simply demilitariza-

53. Eugene Dooman, "Land Redistribution and the Ladejinsky Affair," folder: "Japan Reports, Trip Reports," n.d., ca. late 1954, box 2, Dooman Papers. Diary entry of 18 Aug. 1945, MSAm2021, v. 50, 249, William R. Castle Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. At 252, an entry of 24 Aug. suggests that even in office Dooman was opposed to certain kinds of land reform: "Gene says that they are making blue prints of how best to confiscate the large land holdings in order to distribute land among the peasants," I have not been able to find the "they" in question or their "blue-prints," but I am grateful to Waldo Heinrichs for the reference to the Castle Papers. "Our Occupation Policy for Japan," transcript of radio broadcast in Department of State *Bulletin*, 7 Oct. 1945, 542–43. As Dooman's extensive notes for this speech, actually his half of a debate, which took place on 5 Nov. 1945, lack a title, they will be referred to as his "speech notes." The reference to the basic principle of the New Deal can be found in "speech notes," 21, along with a press clipping from the event, in folder 1-12, box 1, Dooman Papers.

tion and reeducation, but rather the establishment of conditions in Japan which would make for the will to peace. The debate was over how to do this and the common mistake was the assumption that the problem was a simple one because all peoples were by nature inherently democratic. Democracy as we have known it, Dooman insisted, had only emerged as the product of prolonged and arduous revolutionary and evolutionary processes:

I am all for economic reforms which will provide security of livelihood to the individual, for without it there can be no effective democracy. I am all for political reforms toward reposing power in the hands of the people so long as the people is composed of individuals capable of enlightened moral judgement. But I for one am concerned by the easy assumption that in the case of Japan we have only to eliminate the emperor institution, the capitalists and the bureaucrats for the suppressed forces of democracy to appear. It is essential for any intelligent dealing with the problem of Japan to recognize that it is a communalism today as it has been for two thousand years. By communalism I mean that order of society in which the primary importance of the community is recognized and is its constructive principle and in which the interests and welfare—in the broadest sense—of the individual are not an effective element. By way of contrast, I would define an individualistic order of society as that in which the advantages of communal unity are retained, but in which the first preoccupation of government is to safeguard opportunity for the spiritual and material advancement of the individual and to assure liberty of thought, act and initiative—liberty which communalism excludes as dangerous and immoral.⁵⁴

In other words, the problem was much more serious than simply the removal of archaic political and economic structures. Combines and trusts were as inevitable in a communalistic society, with its preoccupation with the perpetuation of privilege, as the Sherman anti-trust law was necessary to safeguard free competition in an individualistic society. The problem was how to transform a communalistic society—one with a profound belief in its exceptional origins, and with members who saw themselves as sacred by virtue of their membership in the national unity—into a free society whose members saw themselves as sacred not because they were Japanese, but because they were individual human beings. Describing the principles that should guide such an effort, Dooman stressed the need for patience, economic security, support for the aspirations of the colonial peoples of Asia for independence, the avoidance of coercive dictation, and reliance on a Japanese leadership capable of distinguishing right from wrong. It would not be possible, he warned, to pull down struc-

54. Dooman, "speech notes," 3, 5–6.

tures in the mind in the way armies were dissolved and munitions factories destroyed. A thorough demilitarization was obviously necessary including a purge of militaristic elements from positions of authority in government and business. So was a reorientation of the system of education. But ultimately the changes desired would require Japanese support and cooperation. The Japanese had not invented *jujitsu* for nothing. They could simply pull while the Occupation pushed. Then, once American troops had been withdrawn, they might simply sweep away whatever reforms and government the Occupation had established. Central among the reforms that would require Japanese support would be the transfer of the repository of sovereignty from the emperor to the people. While this could be easily done on paper, Dooman cautioned, "I can imagine nothing better calculated to inspire among the Japanese contempt for the new doctrine of popular sovereignty than an attempt to force it down their throats."⁵⁵

Unfortunately, and for a variety of reasons, the kind of growing economy that Dooman was convinced was essential to the development of democracy in Japan was not to be seen during 1946 and 1947. Instead, output was only about half of what it had been in the late 1930s. Watching from the United States, the coercive dictation of reforms appeared to Dooman to be the order of the day. The fact that the lower house of the Japanese parliament had, after perfunctory debate, adopted the new Constitution by a vote of 456 to 5 was, he thought, impressive only to those "capable of nourishing an invincible confidence in democracy by obedience."⁵⁶

It is in his unpublished papers of late 1946 that Dooman began to write about "left-wing elements," well represented in high places in the Department of State, who were imposing on Japan the same kind of "reforms" being imposed on Eastern Europe. Describing the situation in China in one of these papers, he suggested that the assistance which had been provided to the Nationalist government had given the world plausible grounds for believing that the United States was supporting the nationalists against the communists. This was the "last charge which anybody familiar with the personal philosophies of Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and John C. Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, formulators of American Far East-

55. *Ibid.*, 11–20.

56. Eleanor M. Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan* (Princeton, N.J., 1970), 134. Eugene Dooman, "Bridges of Friendship," 17, n.d., ca. late 1946, folder 1-18, box 1, Dooman Papers. Contrary to Dooman's impressions, MacArthur—even over issues that he cared about deeply—was determined to rely on persuasion and to use coercion sparingly. See NR 601 (26 June 1946) "Conference with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on Land Reform," box 8968, NRS, SCAP, RG 331, WNRC.

ern policies, would bring against them." There is considerable irony here. If he had stayed in office, Dooman himself might well have been one of those accused of being responsible for "losing" China. Instead, out of office, he helped to launch a McCarthyist campaign against his successor.⁵⁷

In January 1954, Grew and a few of his well-known former colleagues launched a blast of their own against McCarthyism in a letter to the *New York Times*. The series of attacks from "outside sources" which had recently been directed at the foreign service, they maintained, were generally "so flimsy as to have no standing in a court of law or in the mind of any individual capable of differentiating repeated accusation from even a reasonable presumption of guilt." Nevertheless these attacks were having sinister results on foreign service morale and on the prospects for objective reporting. It is relevant to inquire, they wrote, "whether we are not laying the foundations of a Foreign Service competent to serve a totalitarian government rather than the Government of the United States as we have heretofore known it." In a private letter to Grew a few days later, Dooman criticized his stance and claimed that he was misleading a public which mistakenly assumed that he spoke "with knowledge of all the facts."⁵⁸

Where Dooman had once stressed the limitations on America's direct influence over Japan, he increasingly came to emphasize the power of American policy over Japan's economy in his criticisms of postwar policy. Where he had previously recognized the importance of consensus in the development of policy, he now attributed political decisions to the machinations of a few individuals. Where he had once been concerned with the future, he was increasingly—and this after the practical battle over economic deconcentration in Japan had already been won—concerned with a poorly remembered past. It was a past from which he sought not understanding, but something of the vindictiveness he had earlier tried to keep from falling on the Japanese. If power tends to corrupt, as John P. Roche has observed of Lord Acton's famous aphorism, "the absence of power corrupts absolutely."⁵⁹

57. Eugene Dooman, "Asia's Problems and Ours," n.d., 18, folder 1-18, box 1, Dooman Papers. As far as Dooman was concerned, neither the Kuomintang nor the Chinese Communist Party had anything in common with Western democracy or with the individualism of the common people of China. The only proper course of policy was to cease meddling, "ending the flow of help to China and bringing our troops home." Dooman, "Asia's Problems and Ours," 15, 19.

58. Norman Armour, Robert Woods Bliss, Joseph C. Grew, William Phillips, and G. Howland Shaw, "Backing Our Diplomats," *New York Times*, 17 Jan. 1954. Dooman to Grew, 27 Jan. 1954, letter and attached memorandum, box 2, Dooman Papers.

59. John P. Roche, "The Demise of Liberal Internationalism," *National Review*, 3 May 1985, 40. See note 51 above.